But the announcement relayed by the US State Department’s Bureau of Economic Affairs deserves more than a simple repost. Nineteen more countries, including Morocco, have signed the “Joint Statement on AI Opportunity Partnership” during the UN General Assembly High-Level Week in September 2026. According to the State Department, 54 countries have now endorsed it.
I am pausing on this text because it shows how Washington intends to organise, country by country, the spread of its AI ecosystem. It also comes at a moment when the rivalry with China is played out less and less in speeches and more and more in chips, energy and contracts.
What the text actually says
First, a clarification. The statement signed by these 19 countries is not a free-trade treaty, nor a technology purchase contract. The text, published by the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, refers to the “physical backbone” of AI, from critical minerals and energy to compute and semiconductor manufacturing. Signatories say they share the view that the future of AI should rest on trusted collaboration, economic security, innovation and fair competition.
The most structuring passage is the one in which the countries say they will explore ways to jointly export their technology “stack”, including trusted connectivity, to third countries. By “technology stack”, we mean the layers needed for AI: energy, data centres, chips, cloud services, models and applications.
According to the State Department’s presentation, the partnership also provides for joint research and development initiatives on energy, critical minerals production, skilled workforces and “trusted” semiconductor ecosystems. In the excerpts I reviewed, I found no sanction mechanism and no purchase obligation. A specialised outlet commenting on the initial June signing describes it as a symbolic agreement on a “common purpose” and a “shared vision”. That reading should be taken with caution, but it matches what the text suggests.
A two-tier architecture
To grasp the stakes, two mechanisms that overlap without being identical need to be distinguished.
The first is Pax Silica, launched by the State Department in December 2025. It aims to secure supply chains for AI, semiconductors and critical minerals. Under Secretary Jacob Helberg presents it as an “economic security coalition” built on the idea that American security is inseparable from its technological edge. At launch, eleven countries had joined the United States: Australia, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Qatar, South Korea, Singapore, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. According to press reports from August, about two dozen countries are now members.
The second tier is wider and looser: the AI Opportunity declaration, signed in June 2026 by 35 countries, then expanded to 54 in September. This outer circle is the one Morocco has just entered. Joining it is not the same as joining Pax Silica, which makes a considerable difference in terms of commitments.
This architecture follows an older doctrine. In July 2025, Executive Order 14320, titled “Promoting the Export of the American AI Technology Stack”, launched an exports programme tasked with supporting the global deployment of integrated American offerings, under the Department of Commerce. A report by the Institute for Progress, a US think tank, sees a fundamental tension in it. Washington is trying to exploit a limited window of opportunity to persuade countries to adopt its technology before China’s, but many importers may perceive long-term strategic partnerships as coercive.
19 more countries just aligned with the American tech stack.
🇦🇱 🇦🇹 🇭🇷 🇨🇾 🇨🇿 🇩🇴 🇬🇪 🇮🇸 🇲🇾 🇲🇹 🇲🇺 🇲🇦 🇵🇪 🇵🇼 🇹🇴 🇷🇴 🇷🇸 🇸🇮 🇻🇳
For U.S. companies, that means more trusted suppliers and more open markets.
Our Super Intelligence partnership is 54 countries strong and growing. pic.twitter.com/PJhZMQYof1
— State Department Economic Affairs (@EconAtState) October 1, 2026
Why Washington is widening the circle
From the American side, the logic is fairly clear. The message to companies is the one the State Department formulated: more reliable suppliers, more open markets. Each country that aligns with American standards and suppliers becomes a potential customer for chipmakers, cloud providers and model developers.
In an earlier communication, the State Department also mentioned a “concierge” service meant to streamline partner countries’ access to American AI products, from power and cooling to software and hardware.
A second driver is geopolitical. In July 2026, China launched its own organisation, the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO), which several dozen countries have reportedly already joined according to the specialised press. The game, then, is to build networks of alignment before intermediate countries anchor themselves durably in the other camp.
The friction point, being on both sides at once
This is where the subject becomes delicate for the 54. On 14 August, Reuters reported, citing a US official and an internal document, the existence of a draft State Department letter to the signatories of the June declaration. According to that draft, countries could not remain in the American coalition if they also joined the competing Chinese framework. The document was, according to the media that relayed it, undated, and the State Department had not confirmed its existence. I cannot say at this stage whether the letter has been sent, or in what form.
This point is decisive, because many signatory countries practise what analysts call “mixed stacks”. A Singapore-based research centre, Fulcrum, describes this pattern for Southeast Asia: a single system can combine a US-designed chip, a Chinese open-weight model, a regional cloud provider and local data. Vietnam, a signatory in the latest wave, offers an example, as its group FPT is developing an “AI Factory” built on NVIDIA chips and software. Fulcrum notes that recent American pressure could narrow this room for manoeuvre, while judging the hybrid strategy rational for countries that cannot replicate the entire value chain.
What this changes for Morocco
Morocco does not arrive on this ground empty-handed, nor without other partners. Rabat has launched the “Maroc IA 2030” roadmap and the “AI Made in Morocco” project, presented in January by Amal El Fallah Seghrouchni, the minister in charge of Digital Transition, and by Ambassador Omar Hilale. In September 2025, the kingdom signed a memorandum of understanding with the French company Mistral AI, focused on training and developing local skills. A training partnership was also concluded with the AXA group and three ministries.
This momentum reveals a diversification strategy. Morocco seeks to attract European, American and regional players while defending the notion of digital sovereignty, which appears in its own documents. The American signature therefore fits into a portfolio of partnerships rather than replacing it.
Two subjects deserve to be followed:
- The legal framework. According to an analysis by the firm CASRAI, Morocco does not yet have an AI-specific instrument in force. A bill proposing a national artificial intelligence agency, put forward by a coalition of parties, has not been adopted. The ability to host investment will depend in part on the clarity of rules on data and on the use of AI.
- Energy and compute. The declaration stresses reliable energy and infrastructure. Morocco has strengths in renewable energy, but, to my knowledge, no figures on a data centre linked to this partnership have been made public.
The stakes for signatory countries
For mid-sized countries, the equation is classic but demanding. Access to the latest chips, capital and American standards is a real advantage. It carries a potential cost: dependence on export rules decided in Washington and liable to change, as the recent history of semiconductor controls has shown.
For the United States, the risk is the reverse. A very broad but loosely binding coalition can produce good membership numbers without changing states’ purchasing choices. That is precisely what the draft letter sought to correct, according to Reuters.
An open conclusion
The figure of 54 countries mainly says that the diplomatic terrain of AI is organising itself into blocs. It does not yet say what each country will actually do: which contracts, which data centres, which suppliers. The real measure will be there, in the investment and purchasing decisions of the coming months, and in the answer each capital gives to the demand for clarity that Washington seems to want to formulate. For Morocco, the question is not choosing a side, but how far the declared alignment is compatible with the sovereignty it claims.
FAQ
What is the “Joint Statement on AI Opportunity Partnership”?
It is a joint declaration, published by the US State Department, in which signatories commit to cooperating on AI infrastructure: energy, critical minerals, compute and semiconductors. It provides for exploring the joint export of a trusted technology “stack”.
How many countries have signed it?
According to the State Department, 54 countries as of September 2026, after 19 new signatories joined during the UN High-Level Week. There were 35 after the initial signing in June.
Is it the same as Pax Silica?
No. Pax Silica, launched in December 2025, is a tighter group focused on supply chains for AI, chips and minerals. The AI Opportunity declaration forms a wider and less binding circle.
Must Morocco give up other technology partners?
Nothing in the material I reviewed indicates so. A draft American letter, reported by Reuters and unconfirmed, did however point to an incompatibility with China’s WAICO framework. This point remains to be watched.
