In Dakhla, billions of dirhams are being invested in a project whose ambitions go well beyond Morocco’s borders. While political debates drag on in Madrid and the Canary Islands, Rabat is moving forward and preparing a new centerpiece of its maritime strategy.
The paradox is striking: Spain is worried about a Moroccan group acquiring a stake in a Spanish port operator, while Morocco is developing an infrastructure that could challenge part of the commercial advantage the Canary Islands’ ports have enjoyed for decades.
The real danger for Spanish ports does not come from a foreign takeover. It comes from the possibility that shipowners may soon no longer need them as much.
Marsa Maroc enters Boluda, and Spain discovers reciprocity
On December 15, 2025, Marsa Maroc and Boluda Corporación Marítima announced an agreement under which a subsidiary of the Moroccan group would acquire 45% of Boluda Maritime Terminals for €80 million.
The Spanish company would retain 55% of the capital and management of the business. BMT operates nine port terminals in Spain, five of them in the Canary Islands, and handled more than one million containers in 2024.
On paper, the deal looks like a classic international investment. In practice, it has triggered political reactions in the archipelago: the Cabildo of Gran Canaria cited national security concerns and called for the transaction to be blocked, and the deal remains subject to the necessary regulatory approvals. Morocco, for its part, has taken an administrative step by authorizing Marsa Maroc to invest in the capital of the Spanish company.
Spanish intelligence services have probably wanted to slow the operation down. That leaves an awkward question for Madrid: why does the entry of a Moroccan investor into a Spanish port company raise so many concerns, when Spanish groups themselves have every interest in expanding in international markets?
The chairman of Boluda has, in fact, dismissed fears that operations would be relocated. And for good reason: a 45% stake means neither a takeover nor an automatic transfer of operations.
But this transaction reveals a reality that Spain would be wrong to ignore: Morocco is no longer just a neighboring market. It is becoming a player that invests, takes equity stakes and develops its own infrastructure to carry more weight in maritime trade.
And it is precisely on this last front that competition could become far more painful.
Dakhla Atlantic: Morocco is preparing an economic weapon
The Dakhla Atlantic port is not just one more quay on the African coast. It is part of a long-term strategy: strengthening Morocco’s Atlantic seaboard, developing trade with sub-Saharan Africa and attracting commercial flows that currently pass through other platforms.
The project represents an investment of several billion dirhams. Published estimates vary depending on the sources and the phases considered, with amounts ranging from roughly 12.5 to 15 billion dirhams.
The announced characteristics give an idea of Morocco’s ambition:
- Annual capacity: approximately 35 million tonnes for the first phase.
- Container traffic: up to one million TEU of announced capacity.
- Cargo: infrastructure designed to handle dry and liquid bulk.
- Complementary activities: a fishing basin and ship repair facilities.
- Protective structures: approximately 6.75 kilometers.
- Depth: up to 17 meters announced.
The announced schedule provides for completion of the works in 2028 and the commissioning of the first terminals in 2029, subject to how the project progresses.
These figures do not mean the port will immediately handle tens of millions of tonnes or attract one million containers from the outset. Morocco is building an infrastructure designed to host commercial flows that could, tomorrow, choose a different route. It also has a strategic advantage: designing a new port offering around its future ambitions, without depending exclusively on established infrastructure and routes.
Rabat is not just building a port. It is preparing a new gateway to African markets.
The Canary Islands’ ports: a historic position that is far from eternal
The ports of the Canary Islands hold an important place in Atlantic maritime trade. Their location and shipping networks have long allowed them to capture part of the transshipment operations between Europe, West Africa and other Atlantic destinations. But this position is no guarantee of perpetual dominance.
This advantage rests partly on logistical choices. But in maritime transport, a port call is not a marriage: if a shipowner finds a cheaper, more efficient or better-suited solution for its lines, it can reorganize its network.
Transshipment containers are particularly exposed to this logic. They are not necessarily bound for the local market and can be transferred from one ship to another before continuing their journey. The port that receives them must therefore convince shipping companies through its rates, its turnaround times, its reliability and its connectivity.
And that is where the Canarian ports could come under pressure.
First problem: dependence on flows that can change route
Las Palmas’ recent performance shows how important transshipment is to its activity. According to the figures cited for the first ten months of 2025, transshipment operations reached 794,649 TEU, up 25% year on year.
This source of traffic also exposes the port to the arbitrage of the major shipping lines. A shipowner that reconfigures a service, changes its port calls or consolidates its operations in another hub can shift considerable volumes. It does not need to wait for a competing port to overtake Las Palmas in size: it only needs to find a more attractive combination of costs, frequency and coverage.
If Dakhla Atlantic manages to offer a credible proposition for certain services to Mauritania, Senegal and other West African markets, some of the calls currently made in the Canary Islands could lose their appeal. This is a commercial risk that Spanish operators will have to take seriously.
Second problem: competition that could erode margins
Ports compete not only for containers, but also for contracts, regular services and operator investment. Dakhla Atlantic could enter this market with a clear objective: to convince shipowners that a call on the Moroccan coast can improve their logistics organization.
To achieve this, Morocco will need to offer competitive rates, reliable operations and a sufficiently dense maritime connection. If these conditions are met, the Canarian ports would face a difficult choice:
- Cut their rates to keep volumes, at the expense of margins.
- Invest to improve their productivity, weighing on costs.
- Accept losing some operations, with a direct impact on traffic.
Third problem: the need to defend an established advantage
The Canarian ports are not starting from scratch: they have existing infrastructure, customers and established shipping networks. But these assets do not exempt them from adapting. They must modernize their facilities, meet shipowners’ new requirements and defend their market share against a competitor that is building infrastructure geared toward its own ambitions.
Las Palmas is, in fact, investing to accommodate very large vessels, up to 24,000 TEU according to announced projects. Competition is therefore not played out on geographic distance alone: quay depth, the ability to receive large ships and operational efficiency matter just as much. Morocco will have to show that it can bring these conditions together over the long term.
In maritime transport, infrastructure evolves, routes change and historic advantages eventually get challenged.
Dakhla vs. Las Palmas: a battle that goes beyond volumes alone
In 2025, the five ports of the Las Palmas Port Authority handled approximately 36.5 million tonnes of cargo and 1,546,389 TEU, according to the figures cited. These results reflect the current weight of the Spanish platform.
The container capacity announced for Dakhla, up to one million TEU, remains below Las Palmas’ current traffic. It would therefore be misleading to claim that the new Moroccan port will automatically overtake its Spanish rival. But this comparison is not enough to measure the threat.
A port does not need to surpass its rival in total volume to take away market share. It can focus on certain routes, certain categories of goods or certain customers. This is even one of the most credible scenarios for Dakhla: start by capturing targeted flows, then gradually broaden its offering if volumes follow.
The real issue is therefore less whether Dakhla will surpass Las Palmas in tonnage than how much of the traffic currently routed to the Canary Islands could be redirected to Morocco. A shipping line is built around a network of port calls, and changing a single call can alter costs, transit times and the organization of an entire rotation. If Dakhla becomes a regular call on certain African services, the consequences could be felt well beyond its own cargo volume.
It is this possibility that should command the attention of Spanish decision-makers.
Morocco’s masterstroke: preparing the ground before the market tips
Morocco’s strategy does not rest solely on building a port structure. It combines infrastructure development, the expansion of Marsa Maroc, investments in terminals and the ambition to strengthen commercial connections with Africa.
The Boluda deal fits into this logic of international expansion: it gives the Moroccan group a stake in an operator already present in several Spanish port markets. The two files should not be confused, one concerning a minority stake in an existing company, the other the construction of a new infrastructure. But their coexistence illustrates a strategic shift: Morocco is seeking to develop its positions both in international port networks and on its own territory.
Meanwhile, Spain risks making an analytical error if it reduces the issue to the mere presence of Moroccan capital in a Spanish company. The central issue lies elsewhere: what will happen when operators have the choice between more platforms to organize their Atlantic routes?
The Kingdom will no longer be just a neighbor with which Spanish ports maintain commercial relations. It could become a direct competitor in certain market segments. And the most interesting point, from the Moroccan perspective, is that the country does not need to make the Canarian ports disappear to win its bet: it only needs to convince a few major operators and establish itself durably in maritime routes.
For the Spanish economy, that would already be a real slap in the face.
Dakhla at the heart of the Kingdom’s African strategy
To understand the ambition behind Dakhla Atlantic, one must look beyond the port question alone. With the Sahara now an integral part of the national territory, the development of Dakhla is part of a long-term strategy: transforming the southern provinces into an economic crossroads linking Morocco to West Africa and the Sahel.
Far from being a simple infrastructure project, the port is a geoeconomic lever. Its aim is to strengthen trade, facilitate Sahelian markets’ access to the Atlantic and consolidate Morocco’s place in African logistics networks. This ambition is part of a broader African policy: the Kingdom seeks to deepen its economic relations with Mauritania, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and other West African countries, while developing its ties with the landlocked states of the Sahel, notably Mali.
The Royal Initiative to promote Sahel countries’ access to the Atlantic Ocean, announced in November 2023, illustrates this orientation. For landlocked countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, diversifying trade corridors is a strategic issue: it can open up new possibilities for transporting goods, provided that road infrastructure, transit agreements and security conditions allow it.
From this perspective, Dakhla Atlantic could become an important link in a logistics system connecting Moroccan ports to the markets of the continent’s interior. The port alone will not be enough to open a trade route all the way to Bamako. But combined with land corridors, investments and regional partnerships, it could help strengthen Morocco’s position in trade with the Sahel.
Morocco is moving forward, Spain must get ready…
The story of Dakhla Atlantic is not just a clash between two ports. It tells of the possible shift of part of the logistical center of gravity of the African Atlantic.
Morocco is investing in a large-scale infrastructure, seeking to strengthen Marsa Maroc’s international presence and aiming to become a major platform for trade with West Africa. The Canarian ports, meanwhile, must contend with a risk that no annual record can make disappear: the possibility that some transshipment traffic will choose another point of passage tomorrow.
Morocco’s masterstroke is to create a new logistics option before the market has even decided what place to give it.
If Dakhla becomes competitive on rates, reliability and connectivity, shipowners could reorganize certain rotations, port operators would be forced to revise their offers and the Canary Islands could lose part of their advantage on strategic routes. One thing is certain: Morocco is preparing an alternative, and it could cost Spanish players dearly if they fail to defend their competitiveness.
In maritime trade, no one owns the routes forever. And when Dakhla Atlantic opens its terminals, the real question will not be whether Morocco has built a big port. It will be how many shipowners agree to do things differently than before.
FAQ
Can Dakhla Atlantic compete with the Port of Las Palmas?
Yes, in certain segments, notably transshipment and services to West Africa. The extent of this competition will depend on rates, regular services and the volumes Dakhla actually manages to attract.
When will the Dakhla Atlantic port enter service?
The announced schedule aims for completion of the works in 2028 and commissioning of the first terminals in 2029. These deadlines remain subject to change.
Could the Dakhla port take business away from the Canary Islands’ ports?
It is a very plausible scenario. Transshipment traffic is sensitive to costs and shipping routes.
Why is Morocco investing so heavily in Dakhla Atlantic?
The project aims to develop the port capacity of Morocco’s Atlantic seaboard, strengthen trade with West Africa and attract new commercial flows. It is also part of Morocco’s strategy to facilitate Sahel countries’ access to the Atlantic Ocean.
Will Marsa Maroc take control of Boluda’s terminals in the Canary Islands?
The announced agreement covers 45% of Boluda Maritime Terminals, with Boluda retaining 55% and management of the company. It is therefore not a takeover by Marsa Maroc.
