Real estate in China, more than 90% of Chinese people are said to own their home

These sequences are similar to those circulating all over the world. Yet they take on particular significance in a country where the property market is going through its worst crisis since the 1990s.

Behind these images lies a figure that is regularly cited: more than 90% of Chinese people are said to own their home. It places China very high in global rankings, well ahead of Germany or Switzerland, and above France, where the share of households owning their primary residence is around 58%. I wanted to understand what this rate really covers, how it was reached, and why it coexists with a shrinking market.

🇨🇳 Le saviez-vous ? Plus de 90 % des Chinois sont propriétaires de leur logement #Chine
👉 https://t.co/ZYv7ZijSMJ
Sur les réseaux sociaux #chinois, un format s’est installé. De jeunes acheteurs y publient des vidéos « avant-après » de leur nouveau logement. #immobilier #China https://t.co/GNimHlhBJp

— Silicon Valley (@SiliconValleyMa) October 6, 2026

A record rate with political origins

This figure is not the product of a free market that made its inhabitants wealthier. It is first and foremost the result of a state decision.

Until the 1980s, the vast majority of urban Chinese were housed by their employer, whether a factory or a government agency, under the danwei (work unit) system. According to an academic review published in 2013, the homeownership rate in Chinese cities rose from less than 20% in the 1980s to 82% in 2007. The 1998 reform, which ended the allocation of social housing by employers, opened the way to private ownership. Occupants were able to buy their homes on terms that were often very advantageous.

At the same time, the state encouraged large-scale commercial construction and off-plan sales. Hundreds of millions of Chinese thus became homeowners within a single generation. For many families, buying became a cultural reflex as much as a financial choice: ownership is reassuring, and it is often seen as a prerequisite for marriage.

What the “90%” really measures

This is where nuance is needed, because the figure is less straightforward than it appears.

First, it concerns households, not individuals. A young adult living with their parents is counted as part of an owner-occupier household without being an owner themselves.

Second, sources differ. Studies based on the China Household Finance Survey, conducted by the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, put the rate at around 90% as early as 2017. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC), for its part, has cited around 96% for urban households. The gap comes down to scope and samples, not a contradiction.

Finally, part of the population falls outside these averages. Older analyses, including one from 2014, pointed out that the high rate almost certainly did not account for the roughly 234 million city dwellers without an urban hukou, the residence permit that determines access to many rights. Academic research from Delft University has also shown that the hukou continues to weigh on young people’s access to homeownership. Migrant workers, who are more likely to rent, are the great absentees from the flattering statistics.

A 90% rate therefore says nothing about debt levels, housing quality, or the distribution between those who own one home and those who own several.

A market in decline since 2022

The contrast with current conditions is striking. New home prices in China have been falling since April 2022, in the wake of the developer debt crisis. The difficulties of Evergrande and Country Garden have been its most visible symbols.

A few benchmarks give a sense of the scale of the decline, based on National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data relayed by the specialist press:

• new home prices in 70 cities fell 3.0% year on year in August 2026, after 3.2% in July;
• real estate investment fell 9.6% in 2023, 10.6% in 2024 and 17.2% in 2025, then a further 11.2% in the first quarter of 2026;
• Shanghai is an exception, with new home prices up about 3% year on year in August 2026;
• in June 2026, prices rose month on month in 20 of the 70 cities tracked, a sign of uneven stabilization according to Caixin.

For households, the stakes are direct. Real estate accounts for a very large share of their wealth, around 60% according to the central bank’s 2019 survey. When prices fall, the savings of millions of families lose value, which weighs on domestic consumption.

Why these videos, and why now

Showcasing a new home on social media can be read in several ways, which are not mutually exclusive.

The first is social. In a society where homeownership retains strong symbolic value, showing off one’s apartment signals success, stability, and sometimes a milestone reached in life. This content also reflects a universal phenomenon: the glorification of the domestic interior on online platforms.

The second is economic. Falling prices have made some properties more affordable, particularly in second-tier cities. Support measures have also eased the cost of buying: lower mortgage rates, reduced minimum down payments, local subsidies and tax relief, as market analyses detail. For a buyer who had been waiting, the timing may seem favorable.

I nevertheless avoid generalizing. These videos show those who buy and who want to show it. They say nothing about those who give up for lack of stable income, a down payment or a hukou, nor about those hesitating to buy while prices are still falling.

What is at stake for Beijing and the global economy

A high homeownership rate is an asset for social stability. It partly explains why the property crisis has not led to a social shock comparable to 2008 in the West, where home foreclosures played a central role. Chinese owners mostly bought with a substantial down payment and little speculative credit on their primary residence, even though some were hit hard by delivery delays on off-plan homes.

It is also a vulnerability. When most savings are tied up in property, a lasting fall in prices erodes household confidence and curbs consumption. The authorities are seeking to rebalance the growth model toward domestic demand, which makes the issue doubly sensitive.

Opinions differ on what comes next. Some analysts see the signs of stabilization in 2026 as the beginnings of a bottom, while others point out that lower-tier cities suffer from structural oversupply and weaker demographic prospects. Both readings are defensible at this stage.

A success story to put in perspective

The “more than 90%” is a real fact, but an incomplete one. It reflects a spectacular social transformation, carried out in a single generation by the state, and it explains the resilience of many households in the face of the crisis. It says nothing about the young people who cannot manage to buy, the migrants excluded from homeownership, or the future value of this wealth. The underlying question remains open: can a country of homeowners regain sustainable growth if property ceases to be its main investment?

FAQ

Is it true that more than 90% of Chinese people own their home?

It is a plausible order of magnitude, but it concerns households rather than individuals. Surveys range from about 89% to 96% depending on scope, and they poorly capture migrant workers.

Why does China have so many homeowners?

Mainly because of the 1998 reform, which ended employer-assigned housing, and the privatization of existing housing stock. Add to that decades of massive construction and a strong cultural preference for ownership.

Are Chinese property prices still falling?

Yes, but at a slower pace. According to NBS data, new home prices fell 3.0% year on year in August 2026, with sharp disparities between Shanghai and lower-tier cities.

Does a high homeownership rate protect against a crisis?

It limits the risk of a social crisis tied to foreclosures, but it exposes households to a loss of wealth when prices fall.