I remember an anecdote that sums up the paradox of the Spanish army all by itself. In July 2002, six helicopters, commandos and warships were mobilised to retake the uninhabited islet of Perejil, a few hectares of rock 200 metres off the Moroccan coast. The operation succeeded without a single shot being fired. At the time, the episode raised a smile. More than twenty years later, it reads like a warning, because the balance of power with Rabat is no longer what it was in 2002.
I am not trying to run down an institution here. Spanish soldiers enjoy a good reputation within NATO, both for their professionalism and for their discipline. The real question is why the continent’s fifth-largest economy, and one of its most geographically exposed, let its military decline to the point where its own officers are sounding the alarm.
A Francoist legacy the army never truly left behind
To understand the current state of the Spanish forces, you have to go back to Franco. From 1939 to 1975, the army was the pillar of the regime, and its mission was above all domestic: holding the country together. Analysts describe a bloated institution, overloaded with officers and equipped with a motley, ageing collection of hardware, a long way from an army oriented towards an external adversary.
The democratic transition complicated matters further. The attempted coup of 23 February 1981, led by Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Tejero, was a reminder that part of the officer corps still dreamed of seizing power again. The leaders of the time therefore sought less to strengthen the army than to make it docile. They brought Spain into NATO in 1982, held the conditional referendum of 1986, then anchored the country in European frameworks, up to the abolition of compulsory military service in 2001.
This past explains a lasting reflex in public opinion: an army that is useful, but discreet. According to a 2025 Eurobarometer survey, only about 20% of Spaniards consider defence a priority, a level matched in Europe only by Malta.
When weapons are bought on credit
The second turning point, which I find the most instructive, is financial. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Spain, buoyed by its construction boom, launched ambitious armament programmes: the Eurofighter Typhoon, the Leopard 2E tank built under licence, F100 frigates, armoured vehicles and helicopters.
To pay for them, Madrid turned to “special armament programmes”. Instead of weighing on the defence budget, the purchases were financed through zero-interest loans granted via the Ministry of Industry and repayable much later. The logic is that of consumer credit applied to tanks and frigates.
The mechanism holds as long as the economy is thriving. Then the property bubble burst, and the defence budget was slashed. For more than a decade, Spain devoted around 1.2% of its GDP to its armed forces, falling to 0.8% in 2016 according to figures cited by several analysts. The repayment instalments, meanwhile, kept falling due. The result is paradoxical: the money available goes towards paying for equipment already delivered, leaving too little for fuel, spare parts, ammunition and training. Units train less, aircraft sit grounded: the equipment exists, but not the means to use it.
A two-speed military
The current picture is mixed, which is what makes it hard to sum up. Here are the benchmarks I have kept, to be checked against official sources before publication:
- Personnel: around 117,000 active-duty troops, including roughly 73,000 in the army, 20,000 in the air force and 20,000 in the navy.
- Army: a limited number of Leopard 2E tanks, a new eight-wheeled armoured vehicle, the Dragon, whose deliveries are running late, and a notable gap in long-range artillery.
- Air force: modern Eurofighters, but an ageing fleet of F/A-18 Hornets, whose retirement, planned for around 2030, has been pushed back for lack of a replacement.
- Navy: the strong point. The state-owned shipyard Navantia exports its F100 frigates, whose design won over Australia and Norway, and is preparing the F110s as well as the S-80 submarines.
- Aircraft carrier: the Juan Carlos I depends on vertical take-off aircraft for which no replacement is available any more.
In 2025, Spain also gave up on acquiring the F-35 to bet on the European FCAS programme, which is now in serious difficulty. Madrid is therefore left without a clear path for its future combat aircraft. What remains is a navy with a very good technological level, but with a regional vocation: consistent with the size of the country, with no ambition of global power projection.
The southern neighbour is arming
This is where the subject leaves the terrain of budget comparisons and touches on real security. Since the Perejil episode, Morocco has embarked on a methodical rearmament: American tanks, upgraded F-16s, HIMARS rocket launchers, Turkish and Israeli drones, and diversified air defence. According to several estimates, Rabat devotes around 3.5% of its GDP to defence, well above Madrid, and ranks among the largest arms importers on the African continent.
In July 2025, a report from the Spanish Armed Forces’ Higher School acknowledged that Spain’s military superiority over Morocco was no longer guaranteed and that its deterrence capability had weakened. Coming from a Spanish military body, the finding is rare. It takes on particular weight with Ceuta and Melilla, two cities located on African soil, and with the recent tensions around Ceuta, which I invite you to update before publication.
Why Madrid did not rearm sooner
It would be too easy to speak of simple nonchalance. Several reasons, which I find coherent without approving all of them, explain Spanish caution.
First, geography. Far from Russia, Spain does not perceive the threat the way Poland, Finland or Germany do. Next, public opinion. A 2025 poll reported in the press indicates that 58% of Spaniards oppose an increase in military spending, and a 2023 Gallup poll shows that only 29% say they are willing to fight for their country. Finally, politics: Pedro Sánchez leads a fragile coalition, with general elections expected in 2027, and a massive increase in the military budget would be unpopular.
This equation explains the episode at the 2025 NATO summit. When the allies adopted a target of 5% of GDP devoted to defence and security under pressure from Washington, Spain negotiated an exemption, which drew sharp criticism from Donald Trump. From a strictly Spanish point of view, the position is defensible. For the Alliance, it makes Madrid the link its partners consider the most reluctant.
A real but still incomplete awakening
It would be unfair to describe an army left to decay. In 2025, the Sánchez government announced a plan of more than 10 billion euros in additional spending to finally reach 2% of GDP, with a recruitment target of around 14,000 military personnel by 2035. New Eurofighter orders have been placed, and the naval industry is running at full pace.
I take away two possible readings from this picture, which I am not trying to settle. The first is that of the critics: Spain remains well below what its economic weight would justify, and the current effort comes late. The second is that of its defenders: a country with no imminent direct threat can legitimately choose to prioritise its public services, while NATO would do well to admit that not every member has to build the same model of army.
This second idea deserves to be taken seriously. Some analysts argue for a Spanish army oriented towards the western Mediterranean, the Strait of Gibraltar and the Sahel, rather than aligned with the defence model of the eastern flank. That would require a stronger navy, light expeditionary forces and a clear choice on the combat aircraft. Such a project would remain costly, but it would at least have the merit of strategic coherence.
What I take away from all this
The Spanish army is neither a sleeping giant nor an empty shell. It is a tool that has been underfunded for twenty years, built on credit, kept out of the public debate, and now caught in a vice between a southern neighbour that is arming fast and an American ally less willing to act as guarantor. The real question is not whether Madrid will spend more, but what for, and with what clarity. Until the country settles that question, the billions announced risk serving mainly to make up for lost ground rather than to build a strategy.
FAQ
Is the Spanish army really weak?
It is relatively strong in some areas, notably the navy, but behind in the army and in combat aviation compared with the country’s economic weight.
Why did Spain refuse NATO’s 5% target?
The Sánchez government cites the distance of the Russian threat, its social priorities and a public opinion that is largely hostile to higher military spending.
Can Spain defend Ceuta and Melilla?
A 2025 report from the Spanish military school estimates that its superiority over Morocco is no longer guaranteed, which weakens its deterrence capability.
Is Spain rearming?
Yes. A plan announced in 2025 provides for more than 10 billion euros in additional spending to reach 2% of GDP and to recruit around 14,000 military personnel by 2035.
